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ABSTRACT
Cloud computing and digital forensics are emerging fields of technology. Unlike traditional digital
forensics where the target environment can be almost completely isolated, acquired and can be
under the investigators control; in cloud environments, the distribution of computation and storage
poses unique and complex challenges to the investigators. Recently, the term “cloud forensics” has
an increasing presence in the field of digital forensics. In this state-of-the-art review, we included the
most recent research efforts that used “cloud forensics” as a keyword and then classify the literature
into three dimensions: (1) survey-based, (2) technology-based and (3) forensics-procedural-based.
We discuss widely accepted standard bodies and their efforts to address the current trend of cloud
forensics. Our aim is not only to reference related work based on the discussed dimensions, but
also to analyse them and generate a mind map that will help in identifying research gaps. Finally,
we summarize existing digital forensics tools and the available simulation environments that can
be used for evidence acquisition, examination and cloud forensics test purposes.
Keywords: digital forensics, cloud computing, cloud forensics, state-of-the-art
1. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing is an evolved technology that
changed the methods by which data is stored
and processed. The computing paradigm has
shifted from computer and mobile devices to
cloud computing. The low entry cost, the sav-
ing on capital expenditure and flexibility have
made cloud computing an attractive option for
many organisations. This introduces several
challenges with regard to how to perform digital
forensics investigation for cloud based crimes.
Cloud computing has an impact on both the
theoretical and practical aspects of digital foren-
sics. The former includes a need for enhance-
ment of the existing digital forensics processes
and on how to perform them practically. The
latter requires effort by researchers in identify-
ing cloud forensics challenges.
The scope of this paper is to provide a con-
densed analysis of the cloud forensics litera-
ture review by identifying areas that require re-
search attention and pinpointing future needs.
“Cloud Computing Forensic Science” is defined
in (NIST, 2014b) as
The application of scientific principles,
technological practices and derived
and proven methods to reconstruct
past cloud computing events through
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identification, collection, preservation,
examination and reporting of digital
evidence.
In this review paper, there are three dimen-
sions that have been used to categorise the cloud
forensics literature: survey-based, technology-
based and forensics procedural-based.
Survey-based literature covers the challenges
that cloud computing introduces in the field
of digital forensics. Technology-based concen-
trates on the literature studies of cloud foren-
sics based on the underpinning technologies
such as virtualisation and distributed comput-
ing. Also, we propose an additional new classi-
fication of literature, namely procedural-based
cloud forensics. It includes methodologies and
frameworks that target digital forensics proce-
dures, namely identification, preservation, col-
lection, examination and analysis.
Based on our analysis most of the literature
tackles more than one procedure e.g., some of
the publications focused on proposing solutions
for both evidence collection and examination
(this includes event reconstruction).
Paper outline An overview of cloud comput-
ing and digital forensics is discussed in Section
2. Section 3 discusses the used search criteria
and engines. The three main dimensions of the
literature are discussed in Section 4. Section
5 discusses the standardisation efforts in cloud
forensics. The summary of both conventional
or cloud centric tools and test/simulation envi-
ronments is discussed in Section 6. A discussion
on the mind map, research gaps and summary
concludes this paper in Section 7.
2. OVERVIEW OF CLOUD
COMPUTING AND DIGITAL
FORENSICS
2.1 Cloud Computing
Cloud computing has a number of definitions.
The National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology (NIST) defines cloud computing as
A model for enabling convenient, on-
demand network access to a shared
pool of configurable computing re-
sources (e.g., networks, servers, stor-
age, applications, and services) that
can be rapidly provisioned and re-
leased with minimal management ef-
fort or service provider interaction
(NIST, 2014b).
The uniqueness of the cloud environment is a
result of its characteristics. In order to analyse
and study the opportunities and challenges pre-
sented by digital forensics in cloud computing,
it is essential to understand these characteris-
tics.
2.1.1 Characteristics
As identified by NIST (NIST, 2014b) there are
five characteristics for cloud computing, namely,
on demand self-service, ubiquitous network ac-
cess, resource pooling, rapid elasticity, and pay-
per-use business model. Acquiring digital ev-
idence of a suspect whose data is stored in
a shared, multi-tenant and elastic pool of re-
sources may result in privacy violation of legit-
imate users data. Hence, an enhanced digital
forensics model is required to collect forensically
sound evidence for cloud based incidents. In
order to measure the severity of the impact of
cloud computing on digital forensics, there must
be a clear understanding of the cloud computing
service and deployment models (NIST, 2014b).
2.1.2 Service and Deployment Models
Service models are categorised by the type of
computing resources provided to the end users.
• Software as a Service (SaaS), applications
are delivered as a service over the Internet
e.g., Google Mail.
• Platform as a Service (PaaS), the develop-
ment platform is provided as a service e.g.,
Microsoft Azure.
• Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), the
server(s), storage and hardware are deliv-
ered as a service e.g., Amazon Simple Stor-
age Service (S3).
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Deployment models There are four de-
ployment models for cloud computing, namely
public, private, community, and hybrid cloud
(NIST, 2014b). The deployment models differ
based on the users control on the computing re-
sources and their location. For example, public
cloud is owned by the Cloud Service Providers
(CSPs) and its infrastructure is located within
CSP premises. However, in the case of private
cloud, the computing infrastructure is owned by
the user (e.g., a federal or private company)
and it is located within its premises. In each
deployment model, cloud services can be pro-
vided as SaaS, PaaS and IaaS. In a hybrid cloud,
the infrastructure consists of a combination of
the private and public models. In the commu-
nity cloud model, computing resources (server
or network) are shared between several organi-
zations of similar interests, needs and require-
ments.
2.2 Digital Forensics
NIST (2014a) defined digital forensics as
The application of science to the iden-
tification, collection, examination and
analysis of data while preserving the
integrity of the information and main-
taining a strict chain of custody of
data.
There is no single process model that can be
followed to obtain evidence. As stated by Ruan
(2013), there are about four standards for the
forensics process, namely Digital Forensics Re-
search Workshop (DFRW), National Institute
of Justice (NIJ), National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) and Integrated Digital
Investigation Process (IDIP). The main differ-
ence between the first three and IDIP is the in-
tegration of digital forensics process with the
physical forensics. Next is a discussion of each
process in terms of its definition and how the
presence of cloud computing might impact each
procedure.
2.2.1 Process
Cloud computing is a dynamic service oriented
technology. It creates challenges to the ap-
plicability of existing digital forensics proce-
dures. The NIJ process model encapsulates the
DFRWS and NIST process models as well as the
IDIP. Hence, in our review, the previous works
are categorised based on the NIJ forensics pro-
cess as follows:
Identification Determining the type of
crime, software and hardware used by the
suspect and possible evidence locations. In
a cloud computing environment, identifying
the digital forensic requirements to conduct a
sound investigation is considered to be the main
building block in the process of identification.
Preservation Ensuring evidence integrity by
preserving the integrity of the original data.
However, in a cloud environment, the challenge
is how to preserve the data and then determin-
ing whether the existing approaches of measur-
ing data integrity (e.g., using hash functions)
are applicable or not.
Collection Extracting the exact bit-by-bit
image of the required data. Most of the litera-
ture reviews emphasise that collecting the whole
target environment might not be possible in the
cloud environment. This is due to the fact that
the infrastructure is outsourced and owned by
the CSP. Also, the variations of cloud service
models present a whole new set of challenges on
evidence collection.
Examination Studying the collected data
and its attributes. Current computer foren-
sics practices examine well-structured storage
e.g., hard disks; however, in cloud computing
a significant proportion of the target data may
be held in memory/network dumps and/or log
files.
Analysis An in-depth systematic evidence
search is performed on suspect owned devices
in two ways: live and/or static systems analy-
sis. To perform the analysis, many tools and ap-
plications such as EnCase (EnCase, 2014) and
Forensic Tool Kit (FTK) (FTK, 2014) can be
used to aid the investigators. In a cloud en-
vironment, the analyst must consider the de-
pendencies of a cloud based application either
on the service provided within the CSP bound-
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aries or outside. In the case where a complete
chain of custody is not possible, investigators
need to be able to perform analysis on the par-
tial resources in hand (Almulla, Iraqi, & Jones,
2013; Dykstra & Sherman, 2011). Also, there is
the need for a digital forensics tool capable of
acquiring and analysing cloud-based cases e.g.,
FROST (Dykstra & Sherman, 2013).
Presentation The findings will be presented
to either the management of an organization or
a court of law.
2.2.2 Types
Based on the target evidence media, there are
two main types of digital forensics;
Static forensic This is the process of obtain-
ing a bit-by-bit copy of powered off digital me-
dia. Attaching the media to the forensic ma-
chine via a write blocker (before starting the
imaging process) preserves the integrity of the
original data. In spite of its strengths, there
are several limitations of static forensics such as
the failure to capture information stored in the
Random Access Memory (RAM), which may in-
clude encryption keys and network related data.
Live forensic This is a process of collecting
volatile network/user related evidence.
Live forensics is becoming increasingly impor-
tant due to the increase in the size of RAM and
the increase in the use of data encryption. RAM
might contain valuable credentials such as user-
names, passwords and encryption keys.
Another important aspect of live forensics is
to define whether the logged on account is in a
real or virtual environment. The latter requires
further analysis such as the imaging of both the
real operating environment and any virtual ma-
chines located on the real system.
The main issue with live forensics is that, by
virtue of its transient and temporal nature, it
will not normally be possible to reproduce the
results and as a consequence the reliability of
the produced evidence may be questionable.
Most of the literature considers live forensics
to be the best fit for cloud forensics. In fact,
it is strongly dependent on the cloud service
model, CSP cooperation and the target suspect
category (client or CSP). In the case of IaaS
e.g., Amazon EBS (AmazonEBS, 2014), static
forensics may be a more suitable choice. On the
other hand, in PaaS or SaaS, live forensics will
best suit the situation. However, the feasibil-
ity of data access for investigators in the case
of the SaaS and PaaS model will differ signifi-
cantly based on whether the CSP was the vic-
tim and based on its Service Level Agreement
(SLA) support to digital forensics for incidents.
3. STATE-OF-THE-ART
RELEVANT PUBLICATIONS
In our research, we used a scientific database
search engine called Summon a product of Se-
rialSolution (Summon, 2014). The Summon so-
lution not only includes a full record of IEE-
EXplore, Springer, ScienceDirect and Elsevier
but also includes Scopus and Web-of-Science
databases.
The search keywords “cloud forensics” were
used and it was observed that; the total number
of 1412 hits takes into account results for either
the word “cloud”, “forensics” or “cloud foren-
sics”. To accurately identify the desired cloud
forensics related literature, the results were first
filtered by the publication year and the results
per year were then manually checked.
Figure 1 shows the system results per year
and the actual findings. Although the results
from the used search engine showed publica-
tions discussing cloud forensics in 2010, the
term “Cloud forensics” was first used as a key-
word in literature in 2011.
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4. STATE-OF-THE-ART
CLOUD FORENSICS
In this paper, cloud forensics literature is cat-
egorised into three dimensions; survey-based,
technology-based and forensics procedural-
based. Below is a discussion of the literature
review related to each dimension.
4.1 Dimension I: Survey-Based
Researchers who are newcomers to the field of
cloud forensics normally start grasping the sur-
vey papers where there are results of other re-
searchers, literature review findings and possi-
ble challenges that are addressed in this field.
In this section, we classify the survey into two
categories. the first category includes extensive
literature review observations and findings ei-
ther in technical or legal aspects. The second
category includes questionnaires conducted by
researchers to picture the current state of cloud
forensics among the researchers and practition-
ers -includes the Law Enforcement Agencies and
organizational stakeholders- communities.
4.1.1 Literature Survey
Literature review based papers (Birk & We-
gener, 2011; CSA, 2009; George & Mason,
2011; Grispos, Storer, & Glisson, 2012; Hooper,
Martini, & Choo, 2013; Marangos, Rizomilio-
tis, & Mitrou, 2012; Marturana, Me, & Tac-
coni, 2012; Reilly, Wren, & Berry, 2010; Ruan,
Carthy, Kechadi, & Crosbie, 2011; Taylor, Hag-
gerty, Gresty, & Lamb, 2011; Wolthusen, 2009;
Zargari & Benford, 2012) pinpointed technical
and legal challenges that exist in the cloud com-
puting environment. An additional organiza-
tional dimension was discussed by Ruan et. al.
(2011). The authors discussed the possibility
of integrating digital forensics in an organiza-
tion to respond to the cloud based incidents.
It is worth to mention that some of the tech-
nical issues have a history in digital forensics,
yet present unique challenges in cloud environ-
ments.
Technical Issues Most of the computing sys-
tems, if not all, consist of two main components
namely data and system architecture e.g., OS,
hardware, etc. Processing data to generate in-
formation is subject to the system functionali-
ties. Changes in the data management, system
architecture and data processing result in tech-
nology evolution (from personal computers and
mobiles to big-data and cloud computing). In
the case of digital forensics of cloud computing,
not only storing and managing data is differ-
ent but also the system architecture (distributed
computing and virtualisation). These differ-
ences pose additional challenges to the prac-
titioners and researchers. Therefore, we cate-
gorised the technical challenges either as data
or architecture oriented issues.
• Data related issues
Evidence integrity The current wis-
dom is that the documentation of any pro-
cess used and the keeping of an audit trail
of all actions taken together, where pos-
sible, with the use of MD5 hashes, is the
best approach to preserving the integrity
of evidence. In cloud computing, the in-
tegrity needs to be ensured throughout the
data lifecycle such as data upload, stor-
age and retrieval. Hence the complexity of
methodologies in preserving data integrity
has been increased due to the fact that
the data has been transmitted over public
network (e.g., internet) and stored in dis-
tributed facilities.
Application and software streaming
In SaaS and PaaS, application and soft-
ware streaming can be deployed to optimise
the utilization of the network bandwidth
and to increase the performance. This
can be achieved when the server sends the
client the required portion of the applica-
tion (about 10% of the total program) to
launch it and while the client is using the
application, the remainder will be streamed
to their machines. Once the application li-
cense has expired, the CSP will uninstall
the software. In such cases, the investigator
can look for evidence in the client machine
hives (in the case of Windows OS), however
if the application was streamed, it is prob-
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able that the only source of evidence on the
suspected machine will be held in the Ran-
dom Access Memory (RAM) content.
Time stamps and synchronisation
Since the cloud service provider and users
may be located in geographically different
areas, investigators should bear in mind
synchronising the evidence time stamp
with the time of data creation. A consis-
tent time source such as Network Timing
Protocol (NTP) is important to identify the
sequence of evidence and to create a consis-
tent timeline of events across the dispersed
parties -client, CSP and the network-.
Data state Collecting data to build the
case is the core functionality in a digital
investigation. From a technical perspec-
tive, data in cloud computing can be in
one of three states: at-rest, in-transit or in-
execution (Birk & Wegener, 2011). When
an incident occurs, the investigator will
normally seize the digital device to examine
and analyse the evidence. For data at-rest,
the investigation process will comply with
static forensics model. In a cloud environ-
ment this will not normally be possible and
the investigator may be reliant on the CSP
to collect and provide the relevant data.
While data is in-transit, it might leave
traces on the network and on user devices.
Unlike data at-rest, maintaining in-transit
data integrity is not as simple as the case of
data at-rest. Investigators can perform net-
work forensics procedures for incidents oc-
curring within an organization as the net-
work infrastructure is under the control of
the organization. However, it is not the
case in a cloud environment where the end
users are geographically dispersed from the
CSP. Finally, in-execution data is when
the computer system loads data into the
main memory to be processed by the user
or another system entity. Investigators can
analyse in-execution data such as a running
application, process information and ma-
chine instructions for current system state
through the means of a snapshot.
• Architecture related issues
Shared resources A shared pool of re-
sources is one of the characteristics of cloud
computing. Achieving the isolation of the
suspected users information from that of
an innocent party is a very important and
challenging task. In the cloud, the examin-
ers lack of control and knowledge of tech-
nical issues may lead to evidence contami-
nation or a breach of the privacy of an in-
nocent third party.
Seizing cloud computing based equip-
ment Not only the reduced control for
the examiner over the information and
equipment provided by a CSP but also the
an inability to access the valuable informa-
tion that resides in the cloud could also pre-
vent the investigators from accessing criti-
cal information related to the incident.
Cascaded cloud services In situations
where one CSP depends on another, inves-
tigators may face the challenge of cascaded
services and different service level agree-
ments across different geographical areas.
Log format In forensic science, different
file formats are a challenge for the foren-
sics tools and investigators. Since cloud
computing is based on a service oriented
architecture, different log formats may be
deployed to audit user actions. However,
this may introduce challenges on how to
unify these logs.
Tools Insisting on adopting current digi-
tal forensics software and application to ac-
quire evidence from the cloud environment
might no longer be appropriate. For ex-
ample, given the distributed nature of the
cloud, appropriate forensics tools may be
designed in a distributed manner to ensure
the consistency of gathered evidences.
Cloud service models In SaaS, clients
are basically using cloud services through
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the Internet; hence the main source of ev-
idence is the RAM content. In the PaaS,
the application platform is under the client
control; as a result, a client can dictate how
the application interacts with the underly-
ing infrastructure and system logs can be
captured and sent to the service provider
to store them. In IaaS, clients have con-
trol over the entire virtual machine, virtual
storage and virtual network. Also, clients
can configure the system to log all critical
operations performed and preserve it for in-
vestigation (in case an incident occurred).
Digital forensics in/on cloud Using
cloud computing resources to serve the pur-
poses of digital forensics is called on-cloud-
forensics. However, if the suspect is one of
the cloud users or the CSP itself then it
is called in-cloud-forensics (Almulla et al.,
2013).
To sum up, technical challenges can be cate-
gorised either as data oriented or architecture
oriented as shown in Table 1.
Legal Challenges
• Multi-jurisdiction Cloud computing en-
vironments do present significant chal-
lenges to forensics. One of the well-known
problems is that of jurisdiction. Due to
the involvement of multi-jurisdictions in
a cloud based investigation, efforts are
needed for regulations and agreements in
order to ensure that the investigations will
not violate any laws or regulations in the
jurisdiction where the data is physically
stored. Measures must also be taken to en-
sure that the privacy of other individuals or
organization sharing the infrastructure will
not be compromised or violated throughout
the forensic activity.
• Service Level Agreement (SLA) and
Policies Cloud users must ensure that the
CSPs SLA supports investigations in cases
of data breach, a security incident, intru-
sion or any form of suspicious behaviour.
An SLA can be used to define the terms of
use between the user and CSP. In Barrett
and Kipper (2010), the authors highlighted
important points that should be addressed
in the SLA which will then support an in-
vestigation as follows:
– State clearly the tools, procedures, ac-
cess and services provided to cloud
users regarding forensics investiga-
tion.
– Roles and responsibilities between
client and CSP regarding the forensics
investigation.
– How forensics is to be performed con-
sidering different jurisdiction laws and
procedures.
– Availability of an incident response
team under the CSP control.
– The same level of security provisions
and forensics preparedness will con-
tinue to be carried out if another com-
pany takes over the current CSP.
– Users are able to retrieve data when-
ever they want and this should be
stated under the terms and contract.
Also, a format should be available
that is easy to read and understand.
• Readiness and awareness of the le-
gal community Given the massive up-
take of cloud computing services at both
the corporate and government levels; law
practitioners and decision makers such
as lawyers, judges and Law Enforcement
Agencies (LEAs) must be aware of the im-
pact of this new technology trend. For in-
stance, looking for alternatives to the bit-
by-bit image concept to preserve the origi-
nal data.
4.1.2 Questionnaire-Based Survey
In order to emphasise the need for cloud foren-
sics and identify particular issues that have to
be addressed and eventually resolved; Ruan et
al. (2013) and Al Fahdi et al. (2013) con-
ducted surveys where the participants include
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Table 1 Classification of Technical Issues
Data related issues (Affecting factor(s)) Architecture related issues (Affecting factor(s))
Evidence integrity (Data life-cycle, lack of in-
tegrity methodologies)
Shared resources (Isolation)
Application and software streaming (Un-
packaged software, limitation on logs traces)
Seizing cloud computing based equipment (Ge-
ographically dispersed, limited or no physical
control)
Data states (Due to different service models) Cascaded cloud services (Cascaded SLA)
Time stamp and synchronisation (Distributed
architecture)
Tools (Distributed nature of evidence)
Service models
Log format (Depends on the underpinning tech-
nology)
researchers, digital forensics practitioners and
organisation stakeholders.
Based on questionnaires conducted in Al
Fahdi et al. (2013), researchers responded that
cloud computing is the first priority among
technologies that cause security concerns,
whereas, the practitioners ranked it as a
third after the anti-forensics and encryption
technologies. Overall, participants agreed
that cloud computing lacks or has no forensic
tools and solutions that are tailored for cloud
environment. Finally, 58% of the participants
agreed that digital forensics process automa-
tion is very important and will be needed to
overcome future challenges, e.g., cloud forensics.
Other interesting results were published in
Ruan et al. (2013), where the survey was de-
signed and focused on cloud forensics. Readers
can refer to the original survey for further ques-
tionnaire results. Highlights of the results were
as follows. Approximately 81% of participants
agreed that cloud forensics is an important com-
ponent of cloud security. Around 80% of re-
spondents selected the investigation of digital
crime, civil cases, policy violation, etc. as main
cloud forensics usage. About 90% answered
that the jurisdiction is the main challenge for
cloud forensics. Finally, 87% responded that
“Designing forensics architecture for the cloud”
should be the main research direction. How-
ever, the overall response emphasised that the
area of cloud forensics requires significant re-
search effort.
4.1.3 Discussion
Most of the literature studies focused on the
IaaS as an investigation target. To the best
of our knowledge, no research was conducted
to investigate technical findings of the SaaS
and PaaS models. Some of the literature dis-
cussed three service models -survey based- and
others did not identify a particular model for
their framework. Considering the service model
alone was not sufficient. Hence, the statistics as
shown in Figure 2, considered the target service
model in relation to the type of the study, either
survey or non-survey based, literature.
All IaaS PaaS SaaS Not specified
survey 9 0 0 0 4
non-survey 1 7 0 0 1
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Figure 2 Literature Statistics Based on the
Cloud Service Models
Figure 3 shows around 53% of the survey
based literature focused on identifying techni-
cal issues, while 47% on legal aspects.
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Technical
53%
Legal
47%
Chart Title
Figure 3 Percentage of Coverage of Technical
Issues vs. Legal Issues in Cloud Forensics
4.2 Dimension II: Technology-Based
Many technologies are developed with good in-
tentions, however, individuals can use them to
cause harm or hide their malicious activities.
Digital forensics need to be dynamic in adopting
the changes required to cope with these tech-
nologies, especially cloud architecture core com-
ponents such as distributed computing and vir-
tualisation.
4.2.1 Distributed Computing
In traditional digital forensics, understanding
the digital device and operating system is an
important skill required by the investigators. In
cloud computing, distributed systems are com-
municating over network channels to receive
and respond to client requests. A Distributed
File System (DFS) is required to manage the
storage and messages in the channels. There are
several types of DFSs (Thanh, Mohan, Choi,
Kim, & Kim, 2008) such as Client Server Ar-
chitecture, which is a type of DFS that comes
with a communication protocol to allow clients
to access files on the server e.g., Sun Network
File system. Another type of DFS is Symmet-
ric Architecture File System which is based on
peer-to-peer technology (each node acts like a
client or as a server) where meta-data is dis-
tributed over all participant nodes. It uses a
Distributed Hash Table (DHT) based system to
distribute data and keys for objects lookup. In
contrast, in the Asymmetric Architecture File
System, the meta-data is centralized in a sin-
gle server e.g., Network File System (NFS). In
the Parallel Architecture File System, data and
its meta-data is block striped in parallel, and
distributed across multiple storage devices on
multiple servers. It allows concurrent access
to the same file. Finally, Clustered Based Dis-
tributed File System (CDFS) consists of a sin-
gle master which controls several hundreds of
chunk servers e.g., Google File System (GFS)
and HaDoop File System (HDFS). To manage
distributed services in the cloud, most of the
CSPs such as Google, Yahoo and Facebook have
implemented CDFS.
Mulazzani, Schrittwieser, Leithner, Huber,
and Weippl (2011) discussed performing foren-
sics analysis on Dropbox application software.
Dropbox provides synchronous storage services
that are managed by a CDFS. The files are
stored in chunks of fixed sizes. The aim of the
experiment was to show weaknesses and pos-
sible attacks that could be carried out against
users. Some of the chunks are marked as deleted
and can be overwritten with different user’s
data. The notion of online slack space was in-
troduced. It is the assigned but unused stor-
age space from end of the file to the end of the
chunk. The authors successfully provided evi-
dence that was found in on-line slack space and
it can be used to hide files.
Spyridopoulos and Katos (2011) examined
the feasibility of developing a digital forensics
acquisition tool for the distributed environment.
Using Google File System (GFS) and Kos-
mos File System (KFS)-types of CDFS-; they
examined the digital forensics tools based on
distributed system requirements published by
NIST (2004). In conclusion, the authors empha-
sise the need to develop forensics-readiness-by-
design approaches to handle cloud based crime.
Hegarty et. al. (2011) proposed a distributed
digital signature detection framework based on
the cloud storage platform. It is based on de-
tecting the presence of illicit files in cloud stor-
age through file signatures. The basic process
of investigation is as follows: image the storage,
compute the hash values of the files in the im-
age and compare the generated hash values with
known target malware file signatures.
We observed two schools of thoughts based
on aforementioned research. The proposed ap-
proaches either can be applied as an add-on so-
lutions as discussed in Hegarty et. al. (2011) or
by design forensics readiness as in Spyridopou-
los and Katos (2011) and Mulazzani et. al.
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(2011).
Next, we will discuss digital forensics studies
related to virtualisation.
4.2.2 Virtulisation
Virtualisation can be defined as a technology
that facilitates the efficient use of resources ei-
ther by integrating or separating systems in a
logical manner. Scalability, cost effectiveness
and automation in resource management are
very important characteristics for the services
offered in the cloud. For example, Amazon Elas-
tic Compute Cloud (EC2) provides Virtual Ma-
chines (VMs) as a pay-per-use service where a
user has full control and root privileges on the
VMs.
The digital forensics of virtual environments
has been discussed extensively in the literature
(Barrett & Kipper, 2010; Birk & Wegener, 2011;
Marturana et al., 2012). However, in this sec-
tion, we target the literature that discusses digi-
tal forensics of distributed applications based on
virtualisation as in Belorkar and Geethakumari
(2011), Delport and Olivier (2012), Dykstra and
Sherman (2013), Jawale and Narayanan (2011),
Quick and Choo (2013) and Thorpe et. al.
(2012). Given the correlation between Dimen-
sion II and III and to avoid repetition, Del-
port and Olivier (2012), Dykstra and Sherman
(2013) and Thorpe et. al. (2012) will be dis-
cussed in Section 4.3.
Delport and Olivier (2012) proposed utilizing
existing techniques such as Instance Relocation,
Server Farming, address relocation, failover,
sandboxing, Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) and
Lets Hope For The Best (LHFTB) for cloud
forensics. The proposed approaches aim to iso-
late the cloud based computing instances while
maintaining the confidentiality, integrity and
availability of legitimate users information.
Jawale and Narayanan (2011) studied the pri-
vate cloud for Hosted Virtual Desktops (HVD)
through simulation scenarios. The aim of the
paper is to investigate whether current digital
forensic procedures are adequate for use in cloud
environments. Based on the findings, the au-
thors concluded that to identify and extract ev-
idence from VMs that are configured with per-
sistent storage, current digital forensics proce-
dures are suitable. However, identifying and ex-
tracting evidence in a cloud configured as multi-
tenant architecture is not possible using current
digital forensics procedures. The differences in
the findings are not caused by the actual virtual-
isation technology but because of inherent char-
acteristics of cloud environment namely multi-
tenancy.
Belorkar and Geethakumari (2011) presented
an approach to analyse cloud attacks in a Vir-
tual Network Environment (VNE) using fuzzy
clustering techniques. VNE are virtual ma-
chines that are connected using virtual network
components e.g., virtual switches and virtual
Network Interface Cards (NICs) (Kangarlou,
Eugster, & Xu, 2009). In order to regenerate
the events of an attack, VNsnaps was used to
periodically take snapshots of the VNE. The au-
thors concluded that the proposed method can
be used to perform attack security analysis and
it could be used by a CSP in providing security
services.
4.2.3 Discussion
In security and digital forensics practices, it had
always been evident that “born by design” so-
lutions can produce the best results in main-
taining security measures or to aid in digital
forensics practices. One might argue that the
forensics discipline can, in general, not select the
design of the environments that will have to be
investigated; however, to preserve public safety,
government might oblige service providers to
consider digital forensics while designing differ-
ent services. As stated earlier in Section 4.1.2,
the forensics readiness had been considered as
the future research direction. However, Figure
4 shows that about 42% proposed by design so-
lutions and 58% proposed add-on solutions.
To sum up, given the majority of studies
of cloud forensics targets IaaS, 75% of tech-
nical solutions have been target virtualisation
(both distributed and non distributed virtual-
isation) and 25% targets distributed comput-
ing solutions, as shown in Figure 5. Figure
6, shows the correlation between virtualisa-
tion/distributed computing and the add-on/by-
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Add on 
58%
By design
42%
Chart Title
Figure 4 Proposed solution: Add-on vs. by De-
sign
Non-distributed 
virtualisation
25%
Distributed 
virtualisation
50%
Distributed 
computing
25%
Chart Title
Figure 5 Proposed Solution Targeting Virtuali-
sation vs. Distributed Computing
design solutions.
4.3 Dimension III:
Forensics-Procedural-Based
In this section, the literature reviews are cat-
egorised based on the target digital forensics
procedure as discussed in Section 2.2.1. Iden-
tification is defined in terms of whether the re-
searchers identify the target digital forensics re-
quirements they are trying to achieve. These
requirements include evidence integrity, consis-
tency and correctness (Vomel & Freiling, 2012).
Another challenge is to collect, examine and re-
construct evidence from cloud based services.
There are some efforts in proposing framework
Virtualisation 
add-on solution
50%
Virtualisation by-
design solution
25%
Distributed 
computing add-
on solution
8%
Distributed 
computing by-
design solution
17%
Figure 6 Technology Based vs. Add-on/By-
design Literature
or algorithms to achieve forensically sound ev-
idence extraction and reconstruction. In the
analysis part, there exists two subgroups based
on the target evidence, namely the data or
meta-data analysis.
It is worth mentioning that there is no clear
cut line between the literature of each section
as some of the research aim to achieve multiple
goals such as evidence collection and examina-
tion.
4.3.1 Identifying Forensics Require-
ments
There are two issues for which literature is lack-
ing: (1) the ability in identifying the exact re-
quirements and (2) how to formalize these re-
quirements, which can be very challenging.
Vomel et. al. (2012) discussed the digital
forensics requirements of memory snapshots in
a distributed environment, which includes cor-
rectness, atomicity and integrity. The authors
investigated formalizing these requirements for
use later for analysis and testing. The identified
requirements are designed for distributed sys-
tems at the level of a single computing resource
such as CPU. It was distributed in the sense of
having multiple processes that are sharing the
same CPU and memory.
Patrascu et. al. (2013) aimed to achieve evi-
dence correctness of events in a virtual environ-
ment. The authors propose a cloud forensics
framework to monitor users activities by inject-
ing an additional computational layers into the
existing cloud IaaS deployment model.
Mishra et. al. (2012) was focused on enhanc-
ing the existing traditional digital forensics re-
quirements to meet the needs of cloud forensics.
This implies considering its characteristics, ser-
vice and deployment models.
On the other hand, Sibiya et. al. (2013)
proposed an incident scene formalization as a
forensics requirement. Using a probability al-
gorithm in assigning weights to malicious hosts
connected to a victim host, the proposed solu-
tion can intelligently identify the resources an
attacker requires to a victim host. The pro-
posed solution ranks and prioritise the possi-
ble suspected IPs which as a result reduces the
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amount of time and resource required to do the
full IPs analysis that took place on the victim
host.
4.3.2 Preservation
Ideally, if cloud computing entities such as the
client, network and CSP could be acquired as
per the legal notice, then the preservation, in
its current definition, implies that activities of
all these parties should be halted until the case
is over. Practically, this is not the case in the
cloud and it is not achievable.
As discussed by Almulla et. al. (2013) and
Ruan et. al. (2011), because of different types
of crime, it is nearly impossible to acquire the
complete chain of dependencies in the cloud.
In this review paper, the scope of preservation
is limited to utilizing the enabling cloud based
technologies such as snapshots in preserving
partial resources such as storage -data and/or
metadata-, network logs, memory dumps, etc.
A snapshot is a point-in-time copy of users stor-
age and network related data.
The snapshot can be either a single VM snap-
shot e.g., single VM as a victim or distributed
e.g., attack performed using distributed appli-
cation. A distributed snapshot is defined in
Chandy and Lamport (1985), as a point-in-time
copy of distributed computing objects along
with the channel communication messages while
ensuring consistency.
The importance of a snapshot (either as stor-
age or network dumps) in cloud forensics was
discussed in Birk and Wegener (2011), Dyk-
stra and Sherman (2012, 2011), and Quick and
Choo (2013). However, limited efforts have
been made to utilize these resources for digital
forensics.
Belorkar et. al. (2011) (also discussed in
Section 4.2.2) presented an approach to analyse
cloud attacks based on event recognition using
a fuzzy clustering technique. In order to re-
generate the events of an attack, VNsnaps was
used to periodically take snapshots of the VNE.
The authors addressed three important require-
ments: (1) Snapshots contain detailed informa-
tion of all components involved or affected by
an attack which are globally consistent (Chandy
& Lamport, 1985), (2) minimizing the system
down-time in order to capture continuous snap-
shots and (3) ensuring that only the attack vec-
tor -files with above the desired threshold- were
recorded.
4.3.3 Collection
In spite of requirement identification and digital
evidence preservation, evidence collection is an-
other challenge in cloud forensics. Investigators
must maintain the “soundness” of the evidence,
however, throughout the literature it was evi-
dent that digital forensics procedures as they
are currently defined might be impractical for
cloud based crimes and incidents.
Jawale and Narayanan (2011) developed two
case scenarios of Hosted Virtual Desktop (HVD)
to evaluate the applicability of current digital
forensics procedure when: (1) the suspect was
known within the organization, and (2) an un-
known suspect and evidence needs to be ex-
tracted from a shared resource and multi-tenant
environment. The latter drove the authors to
draw the conclusion that current digital foren-
sics methodologies require enhancement to be
applied to cloud based crimes.
Chung et. al. (2012) discussed the impact
of cloud services such as Amazon S3, EverNote
and Google Docs and possible artefact that can
be collected from client PCs and smart phones.
Window 2000, XP, Vista, Windows 7 and Mac
OS X lion were used as PC OSs. iOS and An-
droid as smart phone OSs. The authors pro-
posed a process model for the forensics investi-
gation of cloud based services.
Similarly, Hale (2013) discussed the digital
artefact results after an Amazon Cloud Drive
was used either as a desktop or via an internet
browser. Based on their findings, the authors
propose a forensics method to be followed by
examiners to collect the most relevant evidence
from these artefacts.
Zawoad and Hasan (2012) discussed evidence
collection from a different angle. The aim was to
prove the evidence after collecting it from cloud
environment. This was achieved using a Proof
of Past Data Possession (PPDP) algorithm
(Bloom, 1970). To maintain the forensically
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sound evidence, authors deployed secured cryp-
tographic scheme in generating PPDP. PPDP is
based on Bloom filters where it depends on the
probability used to check whether an element is
a member of a set or not.
4.3.4 Examination
Once the investigators successfully extract the
evidence in a sound manner, the next challenge
is to examine the data by reconstructing the ev-
idence and create a time line of events. There
have been limited efforts made in proposing so-
lutions for event reconstruction in cloud foren-
sics.
One approach has been discussed in Zowad
and Hasan (2012). Another discussed by Dyk-
stra and Sherman (2013), where a cloud foren-
sics tool was introduced to extract and recon-
struct the evidence gathered from a cloud en-
vironment. The aim was to overcome the non-
trivial remote data acquisition challenges, such
as integrity, by using hash trees to store logs and
using cryptographic hashes for the returned re-
sults.
4.3.5 Analysis
There are two categories for collected data from
cloud services: (1) actual data or user content
data and (2) the information related to the data
(meta-data). In an ideal scenario both the data
and its meta-data are important for investiga-
tions. In the distributed architecture of cloud
computing the possibility of evidence acquisi-
tion depends on its availability and the access
control provided by the CSP. As discussed ear-
lier in this section, most of the studies aim to
satisfy more than one forensic procedure. To
avoid repetition, we will next discuss studies
aimed at evidence analysis based on the two cat-
egories;
Content or Data Analysis In some other
cases e.g., claim of illegal videos owner-ship
by a suspect, both the meta-data and the
data are required. Possible approaches to ac-
quire and analyse both data and its meta-data
are discussed in Quick and Choo (2013), Hale
(2013), Dykstra and Sherman (2012), Dykstra
and Sherman (2013), and Martini and Choo
(2012). However, to the best of our knowledge,
Dykstra and Sherman (2012) was the only re-
search target digital forensics analysis of data.
Meta-data Analysis The majority of re-
search as in Patrascu and Patriciu (2013),
Chung et. al. (2012), Sibiya et. al. (2013), Za-
woad and Hasan (2012), Sang (2013), Thorpe
et. al. (2012) argue for a sufficiency of meta-
data for forensics analysis. This is due to a num-
ber of reasons. First, the fact that the storage
is located on the CSP premises and correspond-
ing legal implications increase the complexity
of evidence acquisition and analysis. Second,
the characteristics of cloud computing such as
scalability and multi-tenancy raise the possi-
bilities of information exposure of other users
data. Finally, in most of the cases investigators
need to reproduce crime events which requires
time stamps to prove or refute a hypothesis. In
this case, meta-data can be sufficient to achieve
these goals.
4.3.6 Discussion
Given the coherency and the dependency of dig-
ital forensics procedures, the literature has been
analysed by counting the related studies per
procedures. As shown in Figure 7, the major-
ity of the research focused on analysis, where
the assumptions were that the data was col-
lected and preserved safely. On the other hand,
preservation might be extremely difficult (if not
impossible) due to the dynamicity of cloud envi-
ronment and current practices of digital foren-
sics. Limited research focused on data (the con-
tent) analysis and one possible reason might be
due to the sensitivity of data, privacy, lack of
isolation and higher availability of the meta-
data in comparison to the actual data.
Beside the aforementioned dimensions, one
interesting result of the analysis is that the
majority of the proposed solutions aim to per-
form digital forensics activities (identification,
preservation, collection and examination) for
evidence that resides in the cloud (in-cloud)
rather than using the cloud resources to con-
duct digital forensics (on-cloud). (See Figure
8).
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Identification, 10
Preservation, 5
Collection, 12
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Data, 1
Both, 7
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Figure 7 Procedural based Literature Statistics
In
92%
On
8%
Figure 8 In-cloud vs. On-cloud Statistics
5. CLOUD FORENSICS
AND STANDARDISATION
Given that the cloud computing is the current
technology trend, several standardisation bod-
ies have initiate a cloud forensics centric work-
ing group to cope with the increasing adoption
of cloud services.
The initiation can be either by forming a
cloud forensics working group or enhancing ex-
isting security and digital forensics standards
or guidelines. As discussed in Almulla et. al.
(2013), the Cloud Security Alliances (CSA)
(2009), initiated Cloud Computer Emergency
Response Team (CloudCERT) to prepare for
and respond to vulnerabilities, threats, and in-
cidents in the cloud. The European Network
and Information Security Agency (ENISA)
(Haeberlen & Dupr, 2012) states the need to re-
search in the field of digital forensics investiga-
tions in cloud. The National Institute of Stan-
dards and Technology (NIST) (2014b) formed
the Cloud Computing Forensic Science Work-
ing Group (NCC-FSWG) as an integral part
of the overall NIST effort to facilitate adop-
tion of cloud services for the United States
Government. In June 2014, a draft NISTIR
8006 “NIST Cloud Computing Forensic Science
Challenges” was published (NIST, 2014b).
A recently published report from CSA namely
“Mapping the forensics standard ISO/IEC
27037 to cloud computing” discussed in detail
the international standards of cloud forensics
and its integration to Service Level Agreement
(SLA). A detailed discussion was presented in
identifying the difference between the tradi-
tional and cloud forensics (ISO/CSA, 2014).
The Association of Chief Police Officers
(ACPO) group has published a “Good Practice
Guide for Computer Based Evidence” (ACPO,
2014) , which contains four main principles that
should be used during investigations that may
involve digital evidence. Taylor et. al. (2011),
state that the guidelines must be followed in or-
der to provide proof that the integrity of the
presented evidence has not been compromised
before coming into the control of the forensics
investigator. There were originally five princi-
ples, but due to the evolution of the technology
involved in crimes, the last two were combined
to the current principle number four.
These principles were defined to suit com-
puter based forensics. However, cloud comput-
ing has had an impact on these principles and
research is being undertaken as to how these
principles will be influenced (OShaughnessy &
Keane, 2013).
6. AIDED TOOLS AND
TEST ENVIRONMENTS
In the process of identification, investigators
need to identify the most appropriate tools re-
quired to examine evidence efficiently. As dis-
cussed earlier, besides widely accepted digital
forensics tools such as EnCase (EnCase, 2014)
and the Forensics Tool Kit (FTK) (FTK, 2014),
there is research required to either modify ex-
isting tools or to introduce new tools tailored
to meet cloud forensics needs. For instance,
outsourcing infrastructure in most of the cloud
service models increases the need for tools that
are capable of performing analysis and exami-
nation using a secure remote connection. Also,
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it requires digital forensics tools to acquire and
process memory and network dumps. Figure 9
shows that around 95% of the proposed solu-
tions used existing tools.
Existing tools
95%
New tools
5%
Digital forensics Tools usage in the literature
Figure 9 Percentage of using Existing tools vs.
Proposing new Tools in the Literature
A summary of most of the tools used to
perform digital forensics evidence extraction or
analysis are listed in Table 2.
To test the theoretical approaches, re-
searchers need to identify a suitable cloud test
environment for their experiment test-bed. Ta-
ble 3 summarises the test environments that
were used that could suit a cloud computing
project in general and forensics scenarios in par-
ticular. These environments are designed with
the cloud computing structure and characteris-
tics in mind.
7. MIND MAP, RESEARCH
GAPS AND SUMMARY
7.1 Mind map
The focus of this state-of-the-art review is on
publication results for search of “cloud foren-
sics” as a keyword since 2010, a total of 24 pub-
lications were identified. However, there are
studies (Kangarlou et al., 2009; Bloom, 1970;
Vomel & Freiling, 2012) that have been dis-
cussed because of the importance of technology
in understanding the literature. In this section,
the mind map has been divided into two. First,
Figure 10 discusses the three dimensions. Sec-
ond, Figure 11 presents the different forensics
tools, standardisation and research gaps.
7.2 Research Gaps
As a result of analysis of the related literature
discussed in this state-of-the-art review, we were
able to spot areas of weakness and possible re-
search gaps in the study of cloud forensics.
Complete evidence It is a process of seizing
all digital devices present in the crime scene.
In cloud computing, it is impractical to seize
all digital devices due to the massive storage
capacity, privacy issues of other legitimate users
and the impact on the course of business.
Formalisation Several terms are discussed in
the literature which describe the metrics needed
for cloud forensics. However, the literature lacks
a formal model to describe these metrics. As
discussed earlier, sufficiency and necessity need
to be formalized to measure sufficiency of a por-
tion of evidence that can be extracted from
cloud environment.
Forensics procedures Given different cloud
service models, a one size fits all forensics pro-
cess might not be a solution. Current proce-
dures might fit some of the models, however,
the specific characteristics of the other models
create challenges for the investigators in acquir-
ing evidence from the cloud. This is due to the
variation in the control levels among the user
and the CSP in each service model.
Scalability and load balancing The dy-
namic nature of resource allocation and de-
allocation creates a serious challenge in the
investigation process. How to uniquely iden-
tify each resource and whether it is possible to
record the history of the resource allocation and
de-allocations are some of the questions which
need to be researched. In spite of the effective-
ness of load balancing to increase the perfor-
mance and utilisation of data centres resource,
it creates challenge when these resources need
to be investigated.
Data redundancy In cloud, to increase the
availability; multiple copies of user’s data will
be created and stored around the globe. Given
the different methodologies that the CSP used
to create these copies and the different retention
policies CSP follow in termination of provided
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Table 2 Summary of Digital Forensic Tools used in the Literature
Used Tool(s) Possible usability
Virtual Forensics Computing (GetData, 2014) To boot a forensics image of a suspect.
WireShark (Riverbed, 2014) Captures network traffic between VM and the CSP
Microsoft Expression Encoder4 (Microsoft, 2014) VM windows video recorder
FTK Imager (FTK, 2014) Acquisition of memory and disk images.
EnCase (EnCase, 2014)
FTK Remote Agent (Dykstra & Sherman, 2013) Acquisition of evidence remotely
Encase Remote Agent (Dykstra & Sherman, 2013)
X-Ways (Xway, 2014) Acquisition of Windows and Linux live system
Sleuth kit HaDoop (Carrier, 2014) Faster processing of video files for forensics
acquisition and analysis (initial stage framework)
FROST (Dykstra & Sherman, 2013) Digital forensics tools for the OpenStack
cloud platform
XenAccess (Xen, 2014) Xen VM introspection library (Hypervisor level)
VMWatcher (Calavera, 2014) VMware VM introspection (Hypervisor level)
VMwall (Srivastava & Giffin, 2014) VMware VM introspection (VM level)
Table 3 Summary of Test Environments used for Cloud Forensics
Cloud test environ-
ment
Description Open-source/
Proprietary
BonFire
(BonFire, 2014)
An EU project enables operating a multi-site
cloud-based facility on top of different infrastruc-
ture testbeds such as Emulab
Proprietary
Eucalyptus
(Eucalyptus, 2014)
A software used to build Amazon Work Station
(AWS) private and public cloud
Open-source
OpenNebulla
(OpenNebula, 2014)
An industry standard used to provide virtual dat-
acentres and IaaS
Open-source
CloudSim
(CloudSim, 2014)
A solution to create large scale cloud computing
data center, virtual hosts and capability of anal-
ysis for network traffic
Open-source
Emulab
(Emulab, 2014)
Public facility available for researchers to develop,
debug and evaluate their systems
Open-source
OpenStack
(Apache, 2014)
A project used to create various IaaS architectures
such as storage, compute and network
Open-source
Rackspace
(Rackspace, 2014)
Based on OpenStack and provides IaaS Open-source
Amazon
(AmazonS3, 2014)
(AmazonEC2, 2014)
(AmazonEBS, 2014)
An appropriate solution provide various flavour of
IaaS, Amazon Simple Store Service(S3) as stor-
age, Amazon Elastic Comput Cloud (EC2) as a
computation required for AWS. Amazon Elastic
Block Store (EBS) used for backups
Proprietary
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services, it is crucial to research whether or not
these copies are traceable?
Time stamp and synchronisation Unlike
computer forensics, the evidence is scattered
over the participants of cloud services, that in-
cludes CSP and users. Time can be considered
as a challenge from two perspectives. First, in
terms of the time required to collect, examine
and analyse the evidences. Second, in terms of
the time synchronisation between the gathered
digital artefacts.
7.3 Summary
This review paper highlights the state-of-the-
art in digital forensics of cloud computing. Re-
cently the term “cloud forensics” has a strong
presence in the field of digital forensics. In
this state-of-the-art review, we have pinpointed
when the term was actually used as a keyword
in the literature with aid of search engine SUM-
MON. This paper categorises the literature in
three main dimensions: (1) survey-based, (2)
technology-based and (3) forensics-procedural-
based. Given the increasing impact of cloud
forensics on the standardisation process and its
need, this paper presents most of the interna-
tional standardisation bodies and their efforts
to cope with the current trend of cloud foren-
sics. Analysis of the aforementioned categorisa-
tion has been discussed to aid in identifying the
areas that need more research efforts.
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